

## The Response of *Pesantren* Community Toward the Ideology of Islamism: A Study of *Pesantren* Teachers' Perception in North Sumatra

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This study is a qualitative research aimed to see the response of *pesantren* teachers in North Sumatra, Indonesia toward Islamist ideology. Specifically, this study attempted to find out the perception of *pesantren* teachers toward the ideas of Islamic country, Jihad, non-Muslim leaders and women as leaders. The teachers interviewed are those who teach Qur'an, *Hadith*, and *Fiqh* classes. The data were analyzed by using the data analysis model proposed by Miles and Huberman. The results indicate that the majority of *pesantren* teachers consider that the establishment of an Islamic country and the implementation of Islamic law are important, but they oppose women and non-Muslims as leaders of Muslim communities or a country. According to Bassam Tibi's theory of Islamism, the response of these *pesantren* teachers can be categorized as moderate Islamism, not radical because they support the establishment of Islamic state and Islamic law, yet object to violence to achieve the goals.

**Key words:** *Islamism, Islamic state, jihad, non-Muslim, pesantren, women*

### Introduction

*Pesantren* or *Pondok Pesantren* are Islamic boarding schools in Indonesia. *Pesantren* have been studied by national and international researchers. They have also been researched from different perspectives; from education to sociology. In the modern era, *pesantren* continue to be a serious concern for government and international community since they are associated with radicalism. They also are often accused as the source of terrorism in Indonesia. Some researchers conducted studies on this topic found that *pesantren* are not necessarily linked to the issues of radicalism and terrorism occurred in Indonesia, Southeast Asia and International world.

*Pesantren* have a central role in the provision of traditional Islamic teachings, particularly in Java, and the *Kiai* (Islamic scholars) are the ones who maintain and develop them. *Pesantren* provide Islamic knowledge which covers *Fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), *Hadith* (the record of the words,

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actions, and silent approval of the prophet Muhammad), *Tafsir* (exegesis of the Qur'an), *Tawheed* (the indivisible oneness concept of monotheism in Islam), and *Tasawuf* (sufism). The works of scholars who lived in the 7th century to the 13th century are also still taught in *pesantren* nowadays (Salamuddin, 2014; Wekke, 2013 & 2012). Although *pesantren* are considered as traditional educational institution, some of them have been successful in modernizing their national institutions, implementing modern education systems, yet preserving the classical Islamic teachings (Mujab, 2013). In *pesantren*, the figure of a *Kiai* is very crucial as a role model for the students as his knowledge and personality might lead to destructive cult (Huda, 2011; Solichin, 2018). The facts show that some *pesantren* are not only successful in preserving Islamic traditions and sciences such as; *Tawheed*, *Fiqh*, and *Tawawuf*, but also in bringing up the religious leaders in Indonesia.

Recently, *pesantren* have been accused as the source of radicalism and terrorism. They have been accused of being traditional education institutions that accommodate radical thoughts and terrorists in Indonesia (Turmudi & Sihbudi, 2005). Darmadji (2011) argued that some *pesantren* have radical understanding and are associated to terrorism in Indonesia, however this fact should be placed in the context of transnational movement in the world. Susanto (2017) stated that radicalism in *pesantren* is a polemic, political, and over-generalized issue (Susanto, 2017). However, according to Saifullah (2014), some *pesantren* play their roles in blocking radicalism and terrorism for the sake of religion in Indonesia which is accomplished by teaching multiculturalism to their students (Saifullah, 2014; Kholis, 2017). The findings of the research conducted by Kusmano, Fauzi and Jamil (2015) indicate that *pesantren* reject and oppose radicalism and build an anti-radicalism.

A number of researchers have carried out studies related to Islamism in Indonesia by penetrating the issue of deradicalization movements (e.g. Burhani & Al Rasyidin, 2018; Carnegie, 2013; Hilmy, 2013; Ikhwan, 2018; Ja'far 2017; Jamil & Ja'far, 2018; Mietzner, 2018; Nurlinah, 2018; and Osman & Waikar, 2018). Some others have discussed Islamism in *pesantren* (Atmari, 2018; Fawaid, 2018; Hasan, 2012; Hamdi, 2015; Ma'arif, 2018; Masroer, 2018; Mukaffa. 2018; and Sahri, 2018). However, studies on *pesantren* and Islamism that have been carried out so far have not discussed the issue of how *pesantren* teachers respond to the ideology of Islamism in order to see whether they reject or support it. Thus, this study was conducted to fill this gap with the aim to find out whether Islamist ideology is disseminated through *pesantren* or not.

The view stating that *pesantren* are not the source of radicalism was specifically credited to the institutions in Java only since the research was conducted in Java. Meanwhile the study focusing on *pesantren* outside Java island has not been widely discussed, especially those which are related to radicalism and Islamist ideology. For this reason, this study was also aimed to investigate the response of *pesantren* community in North Sumatra towards Islamist ideology.

To be more specific, this study explored the perception of *pesantren* teachers towards Islamist ideology. Specifically, this study tried to discuss four fundamental issues as follows; (1) how *pesantren* teachers respond to the establishment of Islamic country; (2) how they respond to the concept of *Jihad* in Islam and its association with terrorism; (3) how they respond to the idea of women as leaders; and (4) how they respond to the idea of non-Muslim as a leader for Muslims.

### Literature Review

Indonesia is a country with a majority of Muslim population. However, Indonesia is neither an Islamic country nor using Islam as its basis. This country proudly claims Pancasila as its official, foundational philosophical theory. In the field of education, there are at least three middle-level educational institutions that are developing in this country, namely; schools, *madrasas* (Islamic day schools), and *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools) (Noor, et.al, 2007; Hefner & Zaman, 2007). Most Muslim children get religious education from Madrasa or *pesantren*. The curriculum in Madrasah is incorporated religious studies with science and humanities while the *pesantren* curriculum focuses more on religious studies even though science is also studied by the students (Tan, 2015).

After September 11, 2001, many researchers have investigated the radical Islamism, Islamist and Salafist movements. In Indonesia, *pesantren* have become a concern because they are considered as educational institutions that contribute to radicalism and Islamism (Malik, 2017) even though several studies have rejected these allegations (Haryani, 2018; Lukens-Bull, 2005; Ma'arif, 2018; Salamuddin, 2019; Suryadi & Mansur, 2017). Radicalism refers to the beliefs or actions of people who advocate thorough or complete political or social reform, while Islamism refers to groups of militancy or fundamentalism who believe that Islam and politics are one unit.

Islam and Islamism keep receiving attention from the world. Experts mention that there are two types of Islamist groups, namely; moderate Islamists and radical Islamists. Moderate Islamists reject violence and accept democracy. Meanwhile radical Islamists use violence and rejects democracy and the West influence. Hilmy (2014) divides Islamist radicalism into two, Jihadist radicalism and non-Jihadist radicalism. Hasan (2011) mentions there are three forms of Salafism, namely; Jihadists, Islamists, and Salafi Sunni-politicians. The terms Islamism, radicalism and Salafism are often considered to be the same, so Islamic groups, radicals, and Salafists are divided into two. First, Jihadists Islamist who reject democracy and the Western influence, and justify violence and terrorism. Secondly, non-Jihadist Islamist groups or Islamic institutions that accept democracy and reject violence and terrorism. However, both accept the idea of Islamic country and Islamic *sharia* (law).

According to Tibi (2016), there are six indications of someone who accept Islamism. First, *hakimiyyat Allah* (government of God). This group considers that God is the one that has the right to rule the world. This idea of course contradicts to democracy since democracy is considered from human and should be rejected. Second, *din* and *daulah* (the unity of religion and country). Based on this idea, this group wants the establishment of a state based on Islamic law. They believe that the law stipulated in a country should be based on religion. They also reject Jews and reinterpret the meaning of Jihad. They change the interpretation of Jihad from what has been understood by classical scholars into a modern one. As a result, Islamism has become the main factor of rebellion against the West, which is reinterpreted as the concept of Jihad. The concept of modern Jihadism aims to restore the Islamic dominance. Islamic figures, such as; Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb laid the foundations not only to legitimize violence, but also to change the format of classical jihad from wars carried out by Islamic states to terrors carried out by non-state Islamic actors. Third, this group interprets Islam as a *nizham al-Islami* (Islamic system) and carries a new world order based on the concept of *daulah Islamiyyah*, a sharia-based state, and based on *hakimiyyat* (God's government). Fourth, the *ummah* (the society) which is defined as a political movement where all of the members support the implementation of sharia law stipulated by a country. Fifth, *siyyadatul Islam* (Islamic leadership) refers the group's idea that world should be led by Muslims in order to achieve world peace. Sixth, the purity of Islam. This group rejects secularism and westernism through a purification movement.

Based on the analysis of Tibi's (2016) theory above, it can be concluded that the main goal of Islamists is to fight for Islam as the foundation of a country, including to fight for Islamic law as a state constitutional law. Meanwhile the second indicator leads to the problem of reducing the meaning of Jihad as a war so that the meaning of Jihad is no longer in accordance with the classical *Fiqh* concept.

## Method

### Research Design

This study is a field qualitative research where the researchers play the role as the key instrument. This research was carried out in North Sumatra, a province in Indonesia which consists of various tribes and religions. The eastern region of this province is dominated by Muslims and the western one by non-Muslims (Protestant and Catholic). The number of non-Muslims is also quite large in this area even though the number of Muslims is still a bit higher.

### Participants

There were three *pesantren* taking part in this study, namely; *Darul Mursyid* in the South of Tapanuli, *Ulumul Qur'an* in Stabat, and *Al Raudlatul Hasanah* in Medan. These *pesantren* were selected based on the area where they were established and developed. Pesantren Darul Mursyid in South Tapanuli represents *pesantren* that was established in Mandailing. It was established in 1992 in Simanosor Julu village, Saipar Dolok Hole, South Tapanuli. Pesantren Ulumul Qur'an in Stabat represents the Malay region. This Islamic boarding school was established on April 12, 1986. Meanwhile, Pesantren Al Raudlatul Hasanah in Medan represents a modern and ethnically diverse region. It was established in Medan on October 18, 1982.

Since the focus of the problems in this study is the response of *pesantren* community toward Islamist ideology, not all teachers in those three *pesantren* were selected as the informants in this study. Only those teaching Qur'an, *Hadith*, and *Fiqh* classes were invited to give information for the data in this study. The reason is certainly based on their interpretations of Qur'an and *Hadith* as the primary sources of Islamic teachings, especially those which are related to doctrine, Jihad, women and non-Muslim leaders. Meanwhile, the *Fiqh* teachers were included as they teach the views of scholars about these issues. These teachers were assumed as the persons responsible for

their students' learning process. There were 15 people who were selected as the informants for this study, five from each *pesantren* (three teachers of Qur'an and Hadith and two of Fiqh).

### **Instruments of Data Collection**

Four instruments of data collection were used in this study, namely; questionnaires, in-depth interviews, observation and document studies. Questionnaires are one of the methods commonly used by researchers to collect data by spreading a number of sheets of paper containing questions and designed in accordance with the objectives of the study. The questionnaires were used to find out how the *pesantren* teachers responded to Islamist ideology. In addition to this instrument, the researchers used in-depth interview technique to further understand the basis and the argument why the teachers chose a particular answer provided in the questionnaire. To complete the data, the researchers used observation and document study techniques. Observation is an activity using the five senses to obtain information in order to answer the problem stated. Observations were necessary to conduct to obtain an overview of the *pesantren* activities that were studied in order to find linkages with what was discussed. Finally, the researchers searched and reviewed the written documents owned by the *pesantren* which were discussed and assessed directly related to the research objectives.

### **Types of Data Collected**

The researchers employed two models of data collection tools. First, the data collection tool commonly used in quantitative research, namely questionnaires. However, it served as a supporting instrument. Second, the data collection tool commonly used in qualitative research, namely in-depth interviews, observation and document study. All three are the main instruments in obtaining the data for this study. To obtain the preliminary data, surveys were made for the *pesantren* teachers to find out their responses toward the ideology of Islamism. The questionnaires became the first instrument used to get the initial data. The questionnaires consisted of a number of questions related to Islamist ideology to obtain the teachers' responses toward this ideology. The quantitative data were used to find the initial mapping of *pesantren* teachers' responses. From this questionnaire, the percentage of teachers who support or reject the ideology could be seen. The interviews were focused on the themes discussed; thus, structured interviews were conducted. The observations were also made in the learning process conducted in the three *pesantren*.

## **Data Analysis**

The data obtained from the interview were analyzed using the data analysis model proposed by Miles and Huberman (1984) consisting of four steps; data collection, data reduction, data exposure, and conclusion drawing. The data were collected through questionnaires, in-depth interviews, observation and document studies. Next, the data obtained were reduced through which the researchers sharpened, classified, directed, and discarded unnecessary one. Then, the data were organized in such a way that the final conclusion could be drawn and verified. The next step was the presentation of the reduced data through a series of information organizations that allow conclusions for research to be carried out. Finally, the researchers drew a conclusion which is the answer to the problem statement. To ensure the trustworthiness of the data analysis, the triangulation technique was used.

## **Findings**

In accordance with Tibi's (2016) view that Islamist groups carry the concept of God's government and unity between religion and state, thus they want the establishment of an Islamic state. Experts add that Islamic groups in the world want the establishment of an Islamic state and the enforcement of Islamic law. In Indonesia, several social and political organizations have been struggling to establish a state and a law based on Islam. This is a result of their beliefs about God's government and the unity between religion and state (Tibi, 2016). As a derivative of this belief, Islamists reject non-Muslim leadership and Muslim women (Harmakaputra, 2015; Shehadeh, 2003) and consider the importance of jihad and even suicide bombings in fighting for the ideals of Islam for the benefit of the world (Rusli, 2014). Indeed, there are many indicators of Islamist ideology. Based on the theoretical framework of Tibi's (2016), the views of the *pesantren* teachers studied in this research lead to three main issues, namely the Islamic state, jihad and leadership in Islam.

### ***Pesantren and Islamic State***

The empirical data shows that a small proportion (20%) of *Pesantren* Ulumul Qur'an teachers do not agree with the idea of establishing an Islamic state, or the Islamic-based country even though the majority of them (80%) have the opposite opinion. For those who do not agree, they argue that Indonesia is a pluralistic country. Even though the majority of the population in this country is Islam, some people are the adherents of other religions. As for those who agree with the Islamic

state, they provide several arguments. First, the Qur'an and Hadith ordered Muslims to establish an Islamic state. Secondly, the establishment of Islamic state is the right of the majority adherents (Islam) in Indonesia, and perceived to have the ability to provide justice for the people. Third, the establishment of an Islamic state allows the application of Islamic law in Indonesia, and the enforcement of Islamic law will be able to bring blessings to Indonesian people.

Unlike the first *pesantren*, the majority of teachers in Pesantren Raudhatul Hasanah (four people) reject the idea of an Islamic state while the rest (one person) accept it. The majority of them do not agree because of several reasons. First, the founders of Indonesia had agreed to make Pancasila as the basis of Indonesia and the first principle guarantees that religious people are able to practice their religious practices based on their own religion. Second, Indonesia is a pluralistic country consisting of people of different religions, cultures, ethnicities and race. Thus, the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia is impossible. In addition, there is no need to change the foundation of Indonesia. Islamic law can be applied in Indonesia without having to change the ideology of the country. Meanwhile, the one who agrees argues that if Indonesia becomes an Islamic state, Islamic values can be applied in religious as well as national life of the people in the country. In addition, s/he argues that history has shown that Indonesian leaders have not accommodated the interests of Muslims so far, and the leadership emerged from a non-Islamic system.

In Pesantren Darul Mursyid, three out of five teachers agree if Indonesia becomes an Islamic state, while two others reject the idea. Those who support the argument consider that if an Islamic state is established, Islamic sharia can be applied so that the administration of the state will be in accordance with the instruction of the Qur'an and Hadith. Furthermore, Muslims should have the same leader, not only at the national level, but also at the international level. If an Islamic state can be established on an international level, Muslims will return to their golden age. In addition, they believe that the idea of establishing an Islamic state originate from the commands of the Qur'an and Hadith while the ideas of non-Islamic state came from human's limited thought. Therefore, Islamic countries are more important than secular ones as they are the products of God that is absolute while the secular ones are the products of human. On the contrary, those who reject the idea of establishing an Islamic state propose the following two arguments; *first*, the population of Indonesia is pluralistic, adhering not only to Islam but also to other religions, such as; Christian,

Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. *Second*, there is no need for Indonesia to be an Islamic state because it is more important to encourage Muslims to truly practice their religious teachings. Thus, changing the pattern of people's life into Islamic way is more important than changing the foundation of the country.

### ***Pesantren, Jihad, and Terrorism***

There are four topics to discuss regarding the response of *pesantren* teachers toward Jihad and terrorism. First, Jihad is associated with terrorism. Second, the response to the meaning of Jihad in fighting the disbelievers and idolaters. Third, the status of suicide bombers in Islam. Fourth, the relevance of teaching Fiqh Jihad. These four topics are the central issues in the discussion of Jihad.

#### The Nature of Jihad

Principally, according to the teachers in Pesantren Ulumul Qur'an, Jihad is more than just fighting the infidels and polytheists. They mention that Jihad is a form of sincerity in doing a job. However, one of the definitions of Jihad is fighting the infidels and polytheists who fight the Muslims. In a political context, establishing policies that bring benefits to others can be categorized as Jihad. If a group of unbelievers and idolaters do not oppress Muslims, then they should not be fought, but should be the target of Islamic da'wah (preachings).

All teachers in Pesantren Raudhatul Hasanah agree that Jihad does not only mean as fighting the infidels and polytheists. They argue that the meaning of Jihad is very broad, and people need to see the meaning of the word Jihad in a verse according to the science of interpretation. However, infidels and polytheists should indeed be fought if they destroy the religion of Islam and fight the Muslims. In addition, there are those who claim that the meaning of Jihad is the effort of a Muslim to fight for the implementation of Islamic law, but in a good way. They believe that one of the meanings of Jihad is to fight the infidels and polytheists, but not to fight in an offensive sense, instead in a defensive sense, that is, Muslims defend themselves from their attacks.

The teachers in Darul Mursyid point out that Jihad is not merely a means of fighting the disbelievers and idolaters. The meaning of Jihad is more than just a war. They provide some arguments. First, the meaning of Jihad is vast, not just a war as what has been misunderstood by

some people. Jihad means demanding and practicing knowledge, fighting, preaching, fighting one's desires, and worshiping. Second, not all infidels and idols can be fought. They can be fought when they first fight against the Muslims. Thus, Muslims are defending themselves and defending their rights from the attacks of the disbelievers and the idolaters. The infamous opponents are the disbelievers who are hostile to Muslims. Thirdly, Jihad defined as fighting does not mean killing them, but calling them to kindness.

#### The Relation between Jihad and Terrorism

According to the teachers in Pesantren Ulumul Qur'an, there is a difference between Jihad and terrorism. They believe that terrorism is an act of terror that is not legitimized by Islam while Jihad is the guidance of the Qur'an and Hadith. Terrorism has the dimension of violence and injustice while Jihad is based on love. The victims of terrorism are Muslims while those who called the enemy do not become the victims. Islam has arranged Jihad, and killing can only be done if there are provisions in the *sharia* (Islamic law). In the concept of Jihad, it is forbidden to kill humans unless someone is truly hostile to Muslims. The behavior of terrorists carrying out suicide bombing is not in accordance with the objectives of Islamic law.

The teachers in Pesantren Raudhatul Hasanah agree that Jihad is not synonymous with terrorism as what is alleged by a number of parties. They provide several arguments as follows. First, the association of terrorism with Jihad is an incomplete understanding about Jihad in Islam, and it is a sight that this understanding comes from a narrow interpretation of people about Jihad written in the Qur'an. Second, the association of the two terms is intended to corner Muslims because terrorism that is identical to violence is directed more towards violence perpetrated by Muslims while violence is also committed by any religious group. Third, there is no order from the Qur'an and Hadith to carry out act of terrorism. The command of Jihad is intended to defend the rights for Muslims, not an order to attack any religious groups.

The teachers in Pesantren Darul Mursyid also reject the association between Jihad and terrorism. According to them, Jihad does not have to be done by means of violence while terrorism uses violence as the only way to achieve goals. In addition, Jihad is properly able to bring the world to peace and prosperity while terrorism hurts many parties. There are those who specify that Jihad

has many forms, one of which is Jihad as a war. However, Islam regulates the procedures and ethics of war. Meanwhile terrorism does not pay attention to the procedures and ethics. In fact, terrorists attack innocent civilians and claim that their behavior is justified by the religion and is the Hadith of Rasulullah (Prophet Muhammad). In fact, Islam teaches it is not permissible to kill civilians in a war, for example; children, women, weak people, and houses of worship. Some of the teachers also assert that Jihad brings the culprit to faith and peace while terrorism brings the culprit to disbelief.

### The Suicide Bombers

The teachers in Pesantren Ulumul Qur'an agree that if suicide bombings are carried out in areas that are not included in *dar al-harb* (the house or of war) as in Indonesia, then the perpetrators will not gain martyrdom and heaven. However, if it is done in *dar al-harb* like in Palestine, then the perpetrators will get martyrdom and heaven. Some teachers consider that suicide bombings to destroy the enemy forces must be avoided and sought to use a wiser way. There are many other ways of Jihad, and suicide bombings are actually detrimental and injuring Muslims. Most suicide bombers are not the enemies of Muslims but are part of Muslims or innocent people.

The teachers of Pesantren Raudhatul Hasanah agree that suicide bombers will not achieve martyrdom and heaven. They argue that Islam has never taught anyone to kill themselves or others, except in the battlefield and conditions allowing suicide as a way to destroy the enemies on the battlefield. Some of them add that martyrdom is the way to die in the path that Allah agrees while suicide bombing is the act of judging others who are considered against the sharia law without being punished by a religious court, but in their own way. However, there are those who believe that suicide bombings can be carried out on the battlefield, not in public places. Suicide bombings, for example, can be done to destroy Israeli Zionist forces. Suicide bombing will not be justified if it aims to destroy themselves and society without rights. Others assert that if suicide bombings are carried out in Indonesia, the action is prohibited because Indonesia is not *dar al-harb*. Thus, suicide bombing may be carried out after it is believed that there is no other way to destroy the enemy forces in the area of *dar al-harb*, such as; in Palestine and Israel.

The teachers in Pesantren Darul Mursyid agree that suicide bombers would not get martyrdom and heaven for several reasons. First, if a Muslim dies in a battlefield, his death is not the best of him. Meanwhile, a suicide bomber commits suicide by himself, and although he has the intention of martyrdom, he has been wrong in choosing to proclaim martyrdom. Second, the act of suicide bombing is a mistaken Jihad, let alone the victim is not an enemy of Muslims, but innocent society. Jihad should be done correctly according to Islamic teachings to achieve the martyrdom and paradise. Third, even if the suicide bomber on behalf of Jihad, the law is the same as the suicide law. The suicide law is illegal, and the perpetrator will not go to heaven. In Islam, a Muslim will seize martyrdom when he attacks the disbelieving *harbi* (war-related) who against Muslims.

### The Relevance of *Fiqh* Jihad

The majority of teachers in Pesantren Ulumul Qur'an consider that *Fiqh* Jihad is still relevant to be taught in Islamic education institutions provided the teachers teach the meaning of Jihad according to Salaf scholars such as Imam Syafi'i. In addition, by teaching Jihad, Muslims will understand that a justified war will fight the infidels who first fight Islam and Muslims. However, some others consider that Jihad does not need to be taught because it will cause many problems if it is applied in the modern era. In addition, many teachers are too extreme in interpreting the text of the verses related to Jihad, then they will cause chaos within students' mind.

The teachers in Pesantren Raudhatul Hasanah agree that the topic of Jihad still needs to be taught in Islamic education institutions. However, the Jihad that should be taught is moderate Jihad, not Jihad in the sense of a terrorist group. In addition, it is still relevant to be taught to provide a correct understanding of the meaning of Jihad in Islam. Muslim will not understand the meaning of Jihad correctly without being given good understanding about it.

According to the teachers in Pesantren Darul Mursyid, *Fiqh* Jihad is a part of Islamic teachings, and there is no Islamic teaching that is not in accordance with the era. Second, Jihad which is very relevant to be taught today is Jihad for the sake of knowledge, preaching and worship, not Jihad in the meaning of war. Third, the teaching of Jihad must be studied by Muslims so that they do not misunderstand its meaning according to Islamic teachings. Fourth, Jihad should be taught because

it is the highest worship in Islam and its application is able to uphold Islam and to safe guard the right of Muslims.

### ***Pesantren and the Problems of Leadership in Islam***

#### **The Law for Choosing Non-Muslim Leaders**

Like the teachers in the other two *pesantren*, the teachers in Pesantren Ulumul Qur'an also reject non-Muslims as the leader for Muslim community in a country. They also provide several arguments related to their objection. First, non-Muslim leaders will be against Muslim and their policies will tend to support their religion, not Islam and Muslims. Second, non-Muslim leaders can disturb the foundation of Islam. Third, in addition to contradicting the texts of the Qur'an and Hadith which instruct Muslims to choose a true leader, non-Muslim leaders tend not to defend the rights of Muslims, and leadership is the right for the majority to choose. In case of Indonesia, non-Muslims may not be appointed as leaders because the majority of Indonesia's population adheres to Islam. Fourth, there was no non-Muslim who was appointed as a leader in the period of the prophet Muhammad and his companions.

Similar to the teachers in Pesantren Darul Mursyid, all teachers in Pesantren Raudlatul Hasanah also oppose non-Muslim as leader for Muslims in Indonesia. They provide several arguments regarding to this issue. First, Islam is a religion adopted by the majority of Indonesia's population. Thus, the minority of religious community should provide the right of leadership to Muslims. However, in the areas with non-Muslim populations, people whose religions other than Islam have the right to be a leader. However, it is inappropriate for minority groups to lead the majority group. Second, non-Muslims will not be able to maximize the needs of Muslims. Moreover, they may not side with the interests of Islam. All teachers in this *pesantren* agree that leadership is a majority right, not a minority right.

Based on the result of interviews with the teachers in Pesantren Darul Mursyid, it can be concluded that they disagree if non-Muslims become leaders in Islamic countries or leaders for Muslims. They even use illicit terminology that is unlawful for Muslims to choose non-Muslims as their leaders. They also provide several reasons regarding this prohibition. First, Surah Ali 'Imran verse 28 prohibits Muslims from choosing non-Muslims as Muslim leaders. Second, leaders are role

models and the persons to determine the progress of a country, so they must be trustworthy, fair and honest. These qualities will not be found in a non-Muslim leader. Third, if Muslims choose non-Muslims leaders, non-Muslim groups will be more likely to carry out Christianization activities in the Muslim community. Fourth, if non-Muslims become the leaders, Muslims will not be able to practice Islamic law.

#### The Law of Choosing a Female Leader

All teachers in Pesantren Ulumul Qur'an reject the opinion of women as a leader of a country. They provide several arguments related to this issue. First, Islamic teachings as mentioned in the Qur'an and Hadith forbid women to be leaders because women have many weaknesses than men do. Second, the duty of women is not to become a leader of a country, but to take care of the household. Third, women are less strict and wise which are the characteristics needed for leaders. In addition, if women become the head of a country, their children's education will be neglected.

Of the five teachers in Pesantren Raudlatul Hasanah, all of them refuse the idea of women as leaders. First, women are incompetent and incapable, even tend to damage as they have different roles and responsibilities from what men have. Second, the Islamic teachings have outlined that men are prioritized as leaders. Third, the limitations of women make it difficult for them to bear enormous responsibilities as a leader of a country. Fourth, women can become leaders of a country if there are no more men in the community.

The result of interviews with the teachers in Pesantren Darul Mursyid indicates that they oppose the idea of women as leaders. They use a variety of terms to reject the idea; haram, forbidden, and not good to choose a woman as a leader of a country. First, women are only allowed to be leaders for themselves and lead their children. Second, women should be led by men, not vice versa, as written in the Qur'an, Al-Nisa, 4: 34. Third, women do not have natural disposition because being a leader is a nature in men. Fourth, the female brain created by God is not to be a leader, but to be a follower. Women use their sense more than their minds. Fifth, women can become leaders if men no longer exist. It means as long as there are men, women should not be leaders.

### **Discussion, Conclusion and Implications**

*Pesantren* are Islamic educational institutions that have been existing since before Indonesia's independence. Up to this moment, *pesantren* have become educational institutions where Muslim children inherit and develop Islamic knowledge and sciences. In this educational institution, the works of classical scholars from the Asy'ariyah and Shafi'iyah schools were studied and accepted by the students. During the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the world of *pesantrens* began to be suspected and accused of spreading radicalism and Islamism. Some believe that some *pesantren* directly involve in terrorism cases even though several recent studies reject this allegation.

Related to the previous statement, there are four points of discussion in this study. First, *pesantren* teachers do not share the same opinion about the law of establishing an Islamic state, but the majority accept the idea of the establishment of an Islamic state. This finding indicates that they have the view of Islamists who accept the concept of an Islamic state. Second, the majority of them agree that the meaning of Jihad is not only fighting the infidels and polytheists. They believe that Jihad is different from terrorism, and suicide bombers do not achieve martyrdom and heaven. Furthermore, they argue that *Fiqh* Jihad is still relevant to be taught. The opposing idea of terrorism shows that they are an anti-violence group. This is evidence that they are not part of a Jihadist group that uses methods of violence and terrorism in fighting for goals. Third, all teachers reject non-Muslims as Muslim leaders in a country by proposing historical, theological and sociological reasons. Fourth, they oppose the idea of women as leaders of a country with the main reason that women are weak creatures and unable to carry out leadership tasks.

These findings show that *pesantren* teachers who teach Qur'an, Hadith, and *Fiqh* lessons are moderate and non-jihadist supporters of Islamism. The majority of them accept the idea of establishing an Islamic state, but they reject the notion and movement of terrorists in fighting for the ideals of an Islamic state. Their resistance to non-Muslim leaders show that they are anti-pluralism while the rejection of women as state leaders show that *pesantren* have gender-biased thoughts. These two forms of rejection indicate that they are still classified as Islamic groups. The findings showing their rejection are contradictive to those stating that *pesantren* teach pluralist and accommodative attitudes. Likewise, the research findings confirm that *pesantren* are educational institutions that develop radicalism and not terrorism. The findings show that the views of

*pesantren* teachers are different about Islamic countries. The majority still consider the idea of an Islamic state as important matter. However, they refuse to equate between Jihad and terrorism. They reject terrorism, and they affirm that the acts of terror are not justified in fighting for Islamic ideals.

In the context of Indonesia, the views of the majority of the *pesantren* teachers in this study do not support democracy. Indonesia is neither a religious nor a secular country. The views of the majority of the teachers who agree with the establishment of an Islamic state and reject violence can be called a moderate radical view but considered as understandings that do not support the concept of a unitary state and dismiss the principle of tolerance in the life of the country as Indonesians adhere to diverse religions. These teachers may instill their views on their students, and finally this kind of thinking will continue to develop in Indonesia. Similar to this, the teachers' ideas about the prohibition of choosing non-Muslim leaders and women will continue to develop a discourse on religious and gender pluralism. *Pesantren* as educational institutions will contribute ideas for anti-pluralism and gender. However, apart from those two negative views, *pesantren* reject the way of violence in fighting for Islamist ideology, and this will be a breath of fresh air for emerging future leaders who are friendly to differences.

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